



THE YEMEN TREND

**October
2018**



RESEARCH . ANALYSIS . ADVISORY

The Yemen Trend is a monthly digest that highlights Yemen's key economic and humanitarian trends and political and military developments, providing context and analysis where necessary in order to facilitate informed discussion deeply rooted in the facts.

Executive Overview

In October, UN Relief Chief Mark Lowcock warned the Security Council that the prospect of famine has drawn nearer since his September briefing, and that he had likely under-estimated the scale of the crisis. "The total number of people facing pre-famine conditions, meaning they are entirely reliant on external aid for survival, could soon reach not 11 million but 14 million," he said, warning that the country is on the verge of the largest famine in decades. The food security monitor FEWS NET further warned that Famine (IPC Phase 5) could result from the continued deterioration of the riyal, even if imports through Hodeidah are not blocked.

With pressure mounting over the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, not least from Congress over America's potential complicity, the US secretaries of state and defense called for a ceasefire and consultations with the UN envoy to resume in November. This marks the first time the US is publicly leading the call for action toward a resolution to the conflict since former Secretary of State John Kerry unsuccessfully attempted to strike a ceasefire two years ago. At the same time, throughout October thousands of Yemeni and Sudanese reinforcements were reportedly sent to advance the front around Hodeidah city.

Despite the active conflict in close proximity to the port of Hodeidah, food imports through Hodeidah have continued relatively uninterrupted, nearly meeting the average national requirements over the last six months. Fuel imports through Hodeidah, on the other hand, remained very low, at around a quarter of requirements. At the same time, a Saudi tanker delivered the first installment of an oil derivatives grant worth around \$60 million to Aden port, to help fuel power stations in Hadi-controlled governorates. President Hadi dismissed Ahmed Bin Daghar, in part due to what Hadi called his mismanagement of the economy, and appointed in his place Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed, a Taiz native who was serving as minister of public works and roads.

Timeline

- Oct 02** Saudi Arabia announces \$200 million grant to CBY to help stabilize the economy
- Oct 03** Southern Transitional Council calls for popular uprising to expel the government
- Oct 05** six-day cholera vaccination campaign concludes, nearly 387,400 people reached
- Oct 05** Ground shelling of an IDP camp in Hodeidah governorate kills one, injures 12
- Oct 13** Airstrikes hit two busses, kill at least 15 and wound 23 civilians fleeing the fighting in Hodeidah
- Oct 15** Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed appointed prime minister, Bin Daghar referred for investigation
- Oct 14** Cyclone Laban makes landfall in Al-Mahrah, 11 dead and 124 injuries due to flooding.
- Oct 24** Airstrikes on a vegetable packaging facility kill at least 21, injure 10 in Hodeidah
- Oct 30** US secretaries of defense and state call for ceasefire and renewal of consultations in November

Humanitarian and Economic Trends

Yemen is on the verge of the largest famine in generations, the UN warned. Relief chief Mark Lowcock told the Security Council in an October 23 [statement](#) that the prospect of famine has further increased since his September briefing. He acknowledged that he has issued two famine warnings for Yemen in the past, but explained that in both cases famine was avoided or delayed due to increased humanitarian aid and the removal of the coalition blockade imposed in November 2017. “What I am telling you today is that the situation is now much graver than on either of those two occasions,” he said, adding that the figures provided in September were likely under-estimates. “The total number of people facing pre-famine conditions, meaning they are entirely reliant on external aid for survival, could soon reach not 11 million but 14 million.”

“I think many of us felt as we went into the 21st century that it was unthinkable we could see a famine like we saw in Ethiopia. Many of us had the confidence that would never happen again, and yet the reality is that in Yemen that is precisely what we are looking at.”

Lise Grande, humanitarian coordinator for Yemen
([source](#))

Furthermore, the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) issued an [alert](#), saying “the likelihood that food security will deteriorate further in the coming months is highly concerning.” As before, FEWS NET predicts that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would “become likely” among populations relatively more dependent on imports through Hodeidah and Saleef if humanitarian and commercial imports through those ports stop or decline drastically for a prolonged period. The food monitor added in October that it expects the depreciation of the Yemeni riyal to continue, which could further raise prices on essential commodities and increase the risk of Famine “even in the absence of the physical limitations on imports described above.”


What is the evidence of “impending” Famine?

There was one difference of opinion regarding what the UN, international humanitarian NGOs, and media organizations are largely characterizing an impending famine. MSF published an [interview](#) on October 24 with one of its operations desk managers, in which she says MSF has not witnessed the indicators of famine in the child malnutrition projects it is conducting in Hajjah, Ibb, Taiz, Amran and Sa’ada governorates. “Furthermore, data gathered in the health centers we support in these areas does not indicate pockets of famine or an impending famine,” she said. The MSF representative added that given UN agencies and NGOs have been unable to carry out large-scale nutrition surveys that would provide the necessary data, “there is no quality data available to declare that a famine is imminent.”

In his October 23 statement, Lowcock noted that last year evidence of the first two criteria for IPC Phase 5 Famine was indicated in some areas: at least one in five households is facing an extreme lack of food, and over 30 percent of children under five are suffering from acute malnutrition. The third criteria – that at least two people per 10,000 are dying each day – is more difficult to confirm, he said, but added that “health workers are pointing to the rising number of deaths linked to food-related factors.” He expects the preliminary findings of a nationwide assessment to shed light on the famine indicators in mid-November.

Later in October, Lowcock [explained](#) that his latest famine warning “is a judgment I reached on the basis of the UN’s assessment of the deterioration in the situation on the ground over the last three months. Referencing the FEWS NET alert mentioned above, Lowcock said “[the UN’s] analysis is actually very similar – almost identical – to the latest assessment published by FEWS Net, supported by USAID, on 24 October.”

Imports through Hodeidah are coming under Paradoxically, food imports through Hodeidah improved as the military offensive renewed. In September, 124 percent of monthly food needs were imported through Hodeidah, according to OCHA [data](#), marking the largest monthly quantity in nearly two years (see image below). This marked a 54 percent increase from August, and overall it means that 80 percent of the estimated food import requirements are being met, on average, since the November 2017 blockade. Furthermore, OCHA also [reported](#) that based on data from the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), “in September 2018, from the time a vessel submitted a request to UNVIM for clearance until they eventually offloaded their cargo at Hodeidah or Saleef ports and sailed, it took an average of 13.8 days. There has been a significant improvement since March 2018, when the process took an average of 26.3 days.”




Saudi fuel aid arrived in Aden while fuel imports via Hodeidah remained very low. A Saudi tanker delivered the first installment of a grant for oil derivatives, valued at \$60 million, to Aden at the end of October. [According](#) to the Saudi government, it is for “power stations in governorates liberated by the Yemeni government as part of the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen (SDRPY).” Import data for September shows that unlike food imports, the quantity of fuel derivatives reaching Hodeidah remains consistently low, at around 25 percent of requirements (see image above).

Access difficulties have worsened around Hodeidah city due to ongoing fighting. OCHA [reported](#) that while some shops in the city remain open, supplies are running low and “field reports indicate that shop owners are not replacing their stock, preferring to sell their supplies before deciding whether to close or move to another location.” As of October 26, the WFP [said](#) it has 52,000 tonnes of grains stored in silos near


Hodeidah, “but the security situation was such that the silos remained inaccessible.” The agency estimated it is enough food to feed two million people for a month. Lowcock also [said](#) on October 23 that “several humanitarian warehouses have been occupied [by armed groups] for over two months.”

Due to the continued clashes, particularly in the areas of Kilo 10 and Kilo 16, “the eastern road from Hodeidah city to Sana’a remains blocked,” the relief chief said, “which impacts trade and convoys from the key ports that serve all the population centres of northern Yemen.” IOM likewise [reported](#) the “closure of the road connecting Hodeidah and Sana’a.” While this major road is blocked at the entrance to Hodeidah city, it appears to be accessible east of the city via a northern road. In mid-October, OCHA [said](#) “overland access to Hodeidah remains limited to the northern entrance as the route via Kilo 16 to the east of the city remains inaccessible,” and the NRC [said](#) in mid-October that “one road from Hodeidah to Yemen’s highly-populated inland areas remains open.

Saudi Arabia announced a \$200 million grant to the CBY on October 2. “This grant will contribute, in addition to previous deposits to the Yemeni Central Bank totalling \$3 billion, to easing the economic burden on the brotherly Yemeni people,” the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) [wrote](#). Whereas the riyal was trading at around YER 820 to \$1 on October 1, the value of the riyal improved upon announcement of the Saudi cash infusion, to just short of YER 700 to \$1, AFP [reported](#) based on estimates by money changers in Sana’a. OCHA similarly [reported](#) the riyal rose following the announcement, “to 710-750 YER/US\$ in Aden, Sana’a and Hodeidah cities.” Despite the Saudi grant, OCHA said, “the negative



effects of the currency depreciation continue to be seen in the unprecedented increase in the cost of basic commodities.” As FEWS NET [explained](#) in October, staple foods had largely withstood the devaluation of the riyal over the past two years, but corresponding to the riyal losing half its value since July, “staple food prices have increased considerably in recent months, including a 35 percent increase since July 2018 in Sana’a City.” The food monitor made the graphic below to demonstrate the sharp deterioration over the last four months.



Cyclone Laban made landfall on October 14, bringing torrential rains and flooding to Al-Mahrah. Over 3,000 families were affected, including 11 deaths and 124 injuries due to flooding, [according](#) to figures by the Al-Mahrah governorate Emergency Operations Room (EOR). Thirty houses were also destroyed, and 2,203 families were verified displaced by the cyclone. The flooding also [reportedly](#) “seriously damaged” the bridge linking coastal Al-Mahrah and Hadhramawt.

A cholera vaccine campaign was conducted as tens of thousands more suspected cases were reported. “The latest data from WHO indicates that the number of suspected cholera cases is accelerating in Yemen with roughly 10,000 suspected cases now reported per week,” UN OCHA [said](#) in early October. “This is double the average numbers for the first eight months of this year, when a total of 154,527 suspected cases of cholera and 196 deaths were recorded.” A total 13,403 suspected cases and 26 associated deaths were [reported](#) in the first week of October alone, the last available update by the WHO. The weekly number has stabilized at the country level, but the rate of suspected cases for Hodeidah, Taiz, Al-Jawf, and Lahj was still increasing.

A six-day cholera vaccine campaign ended on October 5, successfully targeting nearly [387,400](#) people. The campaign, which is the second round of a larger cholera vaccination program, took place in three districts in Hodeidah (Al-Hali and Al-Marawiah) and Ibb (Hazm Al-Udayn). The first round, which gave almost 390,000 people in these three districts the first of two required doses, was carried out in August 2018. [According](#) to the WHO, the latest round was enabled by a pause in the fighting that both parties agreed to, dubbed the “Days of Tranquility.”

Displacement in northwest Yemen continued at an alarming rate. An additional 20,000 people have been displaced since August as a result of heavy clashes in Bani Hassan, a district in Hajjah close to the Saudi border, MSF [told](#) the Associated Press. Meanwhile, in Hodeidah governorate, differing figures have been given by the UN: Mark Lowcock, who oversees OCHA globally, [said](#) in his October 23 remarks to the Security Council that “more than 570,000 people have been forced from their homes across Hodeidah governorate since fighting escalated in mid-June.” However, around

the same time, in its regular reports on the situation in Yemen, OCHA [said](#) that “since June 2018, more than 425,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in Hodeidah Governorate.”

Mass casualty attacks on civilians occurred on a near-weekly basis in Hodeidah, mainly attributed to airstrikes. On October 11, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child [urged](#) Saudi Arabia to “put an end to the airstrikes.” The committee, which is made up of 18 independent experts, said that airstrikes have resulted in the deaths of at least 1,248 children since they began in March 2015. Major incidents in October included:

- On October 5, an IDP camp in Khawkhah district of Hodeidah was shelled. The UN [said](#) at least one woman was killed and 12 others injured, including eight children. The UN did not assign responsibility for the attack, but coalition-aligned media and military officials [claimed](#) the Houthis launched the attack.
- On October 13, at least 15 civilians were killed and 23 others injured when a coalition aircraft bombed “two buses filled with passengers at a Houthi-held checkpoint” southeast of Hodeidah city, in Jabal Ras district, Oxfam [said](#). Witnesses said all the passengers were civilians and they were attempting to flee the fighting, the DPA news agency [reported](#).
- On October 24, at least 21 civilians were killed and ten injured “when [air]strikes hit a vegetable packaging facility” in Bayt Al-Faqih district, OCHA [reported](#) (it was also [reported](#) as a “vegetable market”). Separately, airstrikes on three vehicles in Al-Hali district that same day killed three more people and injured six others.

The Houthis increased their suppression of the Baha’i minority religious group. The spokesperson of the Baha’i faith in Yemen, Abdullah Yahya Al-Ayolofi, was [detained](#) by the Houthis on October 11. He was arrested just one day after a group of UN experts released a [statement](#) condemning the Houthis’ crackdown against members of the faith. “We reiterate our call to the de facto authorities in Sana’a to put an immediate stop to the persistent persecution of Baha’is in Yemen and to release those arrested due to their religion or belief,” said the experts, who are a collection of special rapporteurs in the fields of religious freedoms and legal and minority issues. In September, the Houthis opened up criminal proceedings against 24 Baha’i

members in detention, including eight women and a child. Some of the charges include apostasy and espionage, meaning the death penalty is on the table.

Humanitarian organizations faced several new impediments to their work. On October 3, UNICEF announced it was suspending emergency cash transfers because it was unable to operate a call center to receive feedback from beneficiaries. It did not offer any other details. As [reported](#) by the Associated Press, “two individuals familiar with the program said the Houthi rebels who control northern Yemen hindered the launch of the call center because they feared it might reveal their manipulation of the cash transfers.” The UN Children’s Agency [announced](#) the resumption of the program on October 7. The program targets around 1.5 million of the most impoverished households in Yemen, which amount to an estimated 9 million individuals. Relatedly, the Associated Press also said the country director of ADRA, one of the major international relief organizations active in Yemen, was banned from returning to Yemen because he rejected the Houthis’ demand that he use the group’s beneficiary list for aid distribution.

Separately, MSF [announced](#) the suspension of its activities in Al-Dhale’a governorate and withdrawal of its staff following an attack on one of its facilities on October 1. Explosives targeted its staff house, which MSF said was the second attack on the building in less than a week. No one was harmed and it was not clear who perpetrated the attack. The move came at a time of growing insecurity in the governorate, exemplified by additional attacks by unknown armed men throughout October, including an [attack](#) on a government bank and the [assassination](#) of an officer for the UAE-sponsored security forces.

UN agencies were pressured to give good publicity to the coalition for aid contributions, according to leaked UN documents. As [reported](#) by the Guardian, the strings attached to the coalition partner’s \$930 million contribution made earlier this year include that “future grants distributed by OCHA to agencies should be tied to the amount of beneficial publicity given to Saudi Arabia,” and, as written in the agreement, “one would expect from OCHA or [a] recipient agency to publish articles in recognized daily newspapers such as the New York Times or the Guardian, highlighting

our contribution." It is not uncommon for donors to seek positive coverage in exchange for their contributions, but the scale of these demands, the Guardian wrote, was "highly unusual." "The document then sets out 48 specific steps UN agencies have agreed to take this year to publicise Saudi activity covering five different UN aid-linked agencies," including UNDP, OCHA, WHO, and UNICEF.

Political Developments

President Hadi appointed Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed as prime minister. Hadi's October 15 [presidential decree](#) states the decision came as a result of the government's negligence in dealing with the economic and humanitarian situation, primarily the collapse of the Yemeni riyal, and it also mentions the government's "failure" to adequately prepare and respond to Cyclone Laban, which made landfall the day prior (see above section). President Hadi immediately relieved Bin Daghar of his duties, and referred him "for investigation," although details were not provided.

Saeed was [sworn in](#) as prime minister on October 18, and shortly after travelled to Al-Mahrah for his first official trip as prime minister. On October 30 he [arrived](#) in Aden. He was already based there in his former capacity as minister of public works and roads, and as prime minister he is expected to continue living in Aden like his predecessor. Saeed, who is from Taiz and in his early 40s, was also a member of the Hadi delegation to previous rounds of UN-sponsored peace consultations. Compared to Bin Daghar, who was one of the top GPC figures under former president Saleh until switching sides early in the war, Saeed is viewed as a relatively independent technocrat.

The US called for a ceasefire and the renewal of UN-sponsored consultations. "The time is now for the cessation of hostilities, including missile and UAV strikes from Houthi-controlled areas into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in an October 30 [statement](#). "Subsequently, Coalition air strikes must cease in all populated areas in Yemen." Pompeo said consultations with UN Envoy Martin Griffiths must begin in November in a third country, "to implement confidence-building measures to address the underlying issues of the conflict, the

demilitarization of borders, and the concentration of all large weapons under international observation." The next day, British Prime Minister Theresa May [backed](#) the call and Griffiths [said](#) "we remain committed to bring the Yemeni parties to the negotiations table within a month."

Hours before Pompeo's statement was issued, at a public [conversation](#) with the US Institute of Peace (beginning min. 39:34) Defense Secretary James Mattis said he calls on "all the parties, specifically the Houthis and the Arab coalition, to meet in Sweden in November and come to a solution." He told the audience that the parties should "talk about demilitarizing the border so that the Saudis and the Emirates do not have to worry about missiles coming into their homes and cities and airports, and ensure that all the missiles that Iran has provided to the Houthis are put under international watch." In response to a question from the audience, he added (minute 56:23) that "the longer term solution – and by longer term I mean 30 days from now – we want to see everybody around a peace table base on a ceasefire based on a pullback from the border, and then based on ceasing, dropping of bombs, that will permit the special envoy, Martin Griffiths... to get them together in Sweden and end this war."

Margot Wallstrom, the Swedish foreign minister, [said](#) on October 31 said the UN asked if Sweden "could be a place for the UN envoy to gather the parties in this conflict," to which she said should would be happy about it but nothing was confirmed. Saudi media earlier in October [reported](#) that the Austrian government offered Griffiths to host a future round of talks in Vienna.

The UN envoy held several meetings in October in an effort to resume consultations. Griffiths is [reportedly](#) pursuing confidence building measures that include prisoner exchanges, humanitarian corridors, and economic incentives. Whereas between June and September 2018 the effort to prevent an assault on Hodeidah city took center stage, preventing further economic deterioration has become a top priority. "The economic issue is now the overwhelming most important priority," the envoy [told](#) Reuters in October. "Within the UN we're talking about the need for such a master plan... an immediate set of measures over weeks which the World Bank, IMF, UN agencies, the Gulf obviously, the government of Yemen could come together to discuss."

Military and Security Developments

In early October, Griffiths met Emirati officials and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the UAE. He then met with Vice President Ali Mohsen and then Prime Minister Ahmed Bin Daghar in Riyadh, before heading to Muscat, where he met the Omani foreign minister and members of the Houthi delegation. The Houthi delegation head Mohammed Abdulsalam then travelled to Moscow, where he [met](#) Mikhail Bogdanov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, while Griffiths visited Washington, where he met with a range of American officials, including congressmen.

The STC called for a non-violent popular uprising in southern Yemen. In a statement issued on October 3, the Southern Transitional Council called for southerners to launch a non-violent popular uprising, under the protection of the Southern Resistance Forces, to achieve the objective of expelling the government and exerting popular control over state institutions (The STC website released the [statement](#) online, while the official document can be found in three parts here: [1](#), [2](#), [3](#)). The statement followed a large meeting earlier that day between the leadership body of the STC presidency, led by Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC's parliamentary body the National Assembly, led by Bin Ahmed Bin Buraik, and the heads of the STC's governorate-level branches. By the end of October, no major follow-up developments had occurred.

Two of Ali Abdullah Saleh's family members were released by the Houthis. Salah and Madyan Saleh, two sons of the late president, were released from Houthi detention on October 3. The two were captured by the Houthis in December 2017 following the killing of the former president. They were formally pardoned by Mehdi Al-Meshat, head of the Supreme Political Council, and were reportedly [released](#) through Omani mediation. Saleh's brother Mohammed remains in captivity, as does Afash, who is the son of Tareq, Saleh's nephew and the leader of the UAE-sponsored "National Resistance Forces" active on the West coast.

Thousands of reinforcements were sent to advance the frontline around Hodeidah city. The coalition has sent 10,000 new troops toward Hodeidah city, AFP was [reportedly](#) told by Yemeni government officials on October 30. The forces were deployed ahead of a new push on the city "within days," a military official is quoted as saying. This came after the Associated Press [reported](#) on October 24 that tanks and armored vehicles provided by the UAE had arrived in Hodeidah, and Al-Arabiya [reported](#) on October 7 that "large numbers of well-equipped Sudanese forces who will participate in the fighting in south of the city of Hodeidah and its eastern entrance" were deployed. The reinforcements add to the 22,000 UAE-backed Yemeni fighters the Associated Press [reported](#) at the beginning of October were already involved in the operation around the city. Backed by coalition warplanes, they are battling against approximately 5,000 Houthi fighters.

"It's unrealistic to expect coalition forces to remain outside Hodeidah while the Houthis retrench and resupply and while these forces remain vulnerable to snipers and other types of attack from inside Hodeida. So, I don't want to create the sense that this is an open-ended situation: if we're going to shake up the status quo, we've got to do things that apply pressure in the right places to get the parties to the table."

Timothy Lenderking, deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs, US Department of State, on October 4 ([minute 1:09:00](#))

The AP quoted a military official as estimating 1,300 fighters from both sides had been killed since the offensive picked up steam after the Geneva consultations fell through, and said fierce clashes were continuing at Kilo 16, a major point on the highway on the eastern edge of the city. The toll on both fighters and civilians has been so heavy the Houthis have been digging mass graves to bury the bodies, a health official told AP. The New York Times, [reporting](#) from the ground, said "on the front line, Emirati and Saudi soldiers are hard to find. Coalition bases along the coastal highway are guarded by Sudanese recruits, many from Darfur. At the field hospital, the dead and wounded we saw were Yemeni."

Pressure from congress continued to mount over potential US complicity in civilian casualties.

Following Secretary of State Pompeo's certification in September that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken steps to protect civilians, in October a group of bipartisan senators sent a [letter](#) to Pompeo. The certification is required, as per a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act, for the US military to continue its material support for the coalition. The group of senators, which include the authors of the provision in question, voiced their skepticism that the certification was warranted "when the Saudi coalition has failed to adopt some US recommendations while civilian deaths and casualties due to coalition airstrikes have increased dramatically in recent months."

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi also led many senators to further criticize their government's relationship with Saudi Arabia. "I think one of the strong things that we can do is not only stop military sales, not only put sanctions on Saudi Arabia, but most importantly, get out of this terrible, terrible war in Yemen led by the Saudis," independent senator Bernie Sanders [said](#). Driven in part by the above criticisms, two pieces of legislation are expected to be introduced:

- Congressman James McGovern, ranking member of the House Rules Committee, [said](#) in October that he would soon "soon introduce legislation into the United States House of Representatives which would prohibit all US military aid and sales to the Government of Saudi Arabia until the Secretary of State determines that journalist Jamal Khashoggi is alive and free. If the Secretary of State determines that Mr. Khashoggi was killed by agents of the Saudi Government, all US military aid and sales would be prohibited until such time as Congress passes a resolution approving such aid and sales."
- A separate bill, "[H.Con.Res.138](#) - Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress," was proposed in September and is expected to be voted on in November. Unlike a similar bill in the past that failed to pass, this time there are indications of significant support for the bill among some powerful [right-wing](#) political groups.

Recommended reading and viewing:

Shorter articles

- An [investigative piece](#) by BuzzFeed News provides evidence that the UAE hired American mercenaries to conduct an assassination campaign in Aden, including against members of the Islah Party, which is part of the internationally recognized government. The author interviewed the Hungarian-Israeli man who founded the US-based company, Spear Operations Group, and who ran the operations inside Yemen.
- Journalist Iona Craig discusses '[The greatest data project you've never heard of](#)', the Yemen Data Project, an independent initiative that records data on coalition airstrikes.
- Two articles published by the Carnegie Middle East Center tackle dynamics in southern Yemen. [Yemen's Other Proxy Struggle](#) focuses on the competition for influence in Al-Mahrah governorate between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Oman on the other; the second article is about [Russia's Mediating Role in Southern Yemen](#), particularly in building relationships with southern leaders it views as advantageous to its military aspirations in the Red Sea.
- Al-Madaniya magazine speaks to members of the Peace Track Initiative, a women-led Yemeni organization, about [The Treacherous Path for Yemeni Women Towards Achieving Rights](#). Relatedly, the founder and director of the Initiative, Rasha Jarhum, was interviewed about [Women and Yemen's peace process](#) by Project Ploughshares.
- Illuminating the human side of the conflict, a moving article and photos by the New York Times show [the tragedy of Saudi Arabia's war](#).

Longer reports

- [A policy brief about Generating new employment opportunities in Yemen, published as part of the "Rethinking Yemen's Economy" initiative](#), offers recommendations to combat increasing levels of unemployment and economic hardship. The initiative, conducted by DeepRoot, the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, and the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), periodically convenes the Development Champions Forum, 22 leading socioeconomic experts from Yemen. The policy brief is based on their discussions.

- The World Bank Group published a seven-page [Economic Monitoring Brief](#) describing and visualizing various facets of the Yemeni economy. The WBG also published a two-page [Economic Outlook](#).
- In a report on the [Strategies of the Coalition in the Yemen War](#), published by the World Peace Foundation, Martha Mundy presents the argument that “there is strong evidence that Coalition strategy has aimed to destroy food production and distribution in the areas under the control of Sana’a.”
- [National dialogues as an interruption of civil war – the case of Yemen](#), reviews the historical peace processes that have taken place in Yemen between 1963 and 2013, then presents a comparative analysis between these efforts and the National Dialogue Conference.
- In [Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen](#), a research paper by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, three authors chronicle the UN’s as-of-yet unsuccessful mediation in the three Arab states.
- A [Case study on CTP and risks in Yemen 2015-2018](#), commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), which found that cash transfer programming (CTP) “was highly appropriate for, and suited to, the Yemeni context, and in some ways perceived as less risky than other related in-kind modalities.”
- A World Bank Group report on [Delivering Social Protection in the Midst of Conflict and Crisis](#) examines the lessons learned thus far from the implementation of the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project.

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